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HATE SPEECH LAW AND DISAGREEMENT
THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH. By Jeremy Waldron.1
Harvard University Press. 2012. Pp. vii + 292. $26.95
(cloth).
James Allan

2

Jeremy Waldron is erudite, well-published and well-known.
He currently divides his time between being a professor of law at
the New York University School of Law in the United States
and being a Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at
All Souls College, Oxford University in the United Kingdom,
though the latter of these posts is comparatively recent. And of
course prior to both of these Waldron held full-time positions at
Columbia and Berkeley law schools and outside the law school
world at Princeton University and Edinburgh University.
I mentioned above that Professor Waldron is well-published
but putting it that way rather trivializes just how prolific and
wide-ranging his writings have been. Waldron, a legal philosopher and philosopher more generally, has written on the idea
of private property in relation to claims about fundamental
3
4
rights; he has written on the Rule of Law; he has attempted to
make a case for greater receptivity by United States courts to
5
consider overseas case law; he has delved into Kant’s legal
6
thinking; he has had an on-going interest in thinking about and
1. University Professor, New York University School of Law; Chichele Professor
of Social and Political Theory, All Souls College, University of Oxford.
2. Garrick Professor of Law, University of Queensland, Australia; Card visiting
Professor of Law, University Of San Diego School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Larry Alexander, Richard Ekins, Adam Hirsch, Grant Huscroft and Steven Smith for
their comments on an earlier draft. And thanks, too, to Christen Somerville.
3. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988).
4. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept
(in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002).
5. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (2005); but see my response and rejection of the Waldronian argument in
James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133
(2008) [hereinafter Allan, Philosopher’s Stone].
6. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535
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8

analyzing rights; and he has written on torture, to give just a
sampling of the scope of Waldron’s interests.
That said, it seems to me that Jeremy Waldron is best
9
known for his work on strong judicial review of the American
sort that empowers unelected top judges to gainsay the elected
legislature, indeed to strike down and invalidate the statutes
produced by these law-makers. Waldron is against giving this
10
power to the judiciary though his opposition to this countermajoritarian practice appears latterly to have become more
hedged about with qualifications, conditional premises and
11
12
exceptions, or so it appears to me.
Whether you agree with that “this is what Waldron is best
known for” claim of mine, or not, remember it because it will
make a cameo reappearance below. Indeed, it will form one
ancillary plank of my argument that Waldron’s underlying thesis
in his most recent book is ultimately unpersuasive and
unsatisfying.
I refer to Jeremy Waldron’s The Harm in Hate Speech, a
consideration of which will take up the rest of this review. In
Part A I will briefly introduce the book, outline its contents and
sketch Waldron’s thesis and arguments. Then in Part B I will say
why I think that Waldron fails in this book, by which I mean that
he fails in the end to offer up a convincing, persuasive and
satisfying argument for his ultimate position. Of course Waldron
certainly does not fail in being interesting, erudite, informative
and, at times, (my favorite) provocative.

(1996).
7. This starts as far back as Waldron’s introduction to (and editorship of)
THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
8. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the
White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005).
9. See Allan, Philosopher’s Stone, supra note 5.
10. For a chronological sampling, see Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of
Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993), Jeremy Waldron,
Freeman’s Defense of Judicial Review, 13 L. & PHIL. 27 (1994), JEREMY WALDRON, LAW
AND DISAGREEMENT (1999), and Jeremy Waldron, Eisgruber’s House of Lords, 37
U.S.F. L. REV. 89 (2002).
11. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L.J. 1346 (2006).
12. Indeed I have alluded to this, and to how Waldron’s normative case against
giving judges over much moral input at the point-of-application does not seem to carry
over into Waldron’s preferred theory of constitutional interpretation—or to his view of
statutory bills of rights. See Allan, Philosopher’s Stone, supra note 5; See also James
Allan, Fantastic Mr. Fox—A Review of Brian Simpson’s “Reflections on ‘The Concept of
Law,’” 23 KING’S L.J. 331, 337 (2012).
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PART A—INTRODUCING THE BOOK AND ITS
CONTENTS
The Harm in Hate Speech was published in 2012. As
Waldron himself makes clear in chapter one, the book’s genesis
lay in a review Waldron wrote for the New York Review of
13
Books of a book by Anthony Lewis on the topic of free speech.
It was the response to that review, at least in part, that Waldron
tells us in his introductory first chapter that prompted him to
flesh out that Lewis review into this book, The Harm in Hate
Speech.
So in chapter two Waldron gives us an expanded version of
that Lewis review of his. Then in chapters three and four we get
Waldron’s positive case, the most favorable account or defense
of hate speech laws he can give. Chapter five deals largely with
needed distinctions, complexities and qualifications, including
the distinction crucial to his argument—the one distinguishing
between offending people and attacking their dignity. Waldron,
as you might suspect, does not think laws that regulate hate
speech ought to extend to protecting against felt offense whereas
they should, thinks Waldron, cover dignity-degrading or dignityenervating hateful words. And of course Waldron argues that he
can uphold this distinction; that the latter (dignity protection)
need not, even in the hurly burly of real-life regulation, regularly
and consistently end up being used merely to prevent or
foreclose speech that causes offense.
Chapters six and seven are defensive in nature. They can be
thought of as pre-emptive replies or counter-arguments to the
anti-hate speech laws positions firstly of C. Edwin Baker
(chapter six) and secondly of Ronald Dworkin (chapter seven).
The last chapter of the book, chapter eight, then turns to history.
Here Waldron attempts to draw a link between the modern
debate over hate speech laws and the Enlightenment concern
with religious toleration, Waldron arguing that the two are, or at
least can be understood to be, connected.
If that is a bare outline of the structure of the book, let me
now turn to the gist of Waldron’s argument in The Harm in Hate
Speech.
First off, I need to make it abundantly clear that Waldron
does not offer up an argument about American First

13. ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007).
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Amendment jurisprudence: “Still less is it my aim to make a case
for the constitutional acceptability of [hate speech] laws in the
United States” (p.11, but see also p. 103, inter alia), he says. Of
course there are occasional asides about how the existing U.S.
case law may, just, leave scope for some sort of constitutionally
valid hate speech laws (see p.28 ff, inter alia). But more than
once Waldron concedes that “. . . it is unlikely that [anti-hate
speech] legislation . . . will ever pass constitutional muster in
America” (p.11).
So it is not that sort of parsing-of-precedents book, nor even
a “here’s what a return to first principles constitutional
interpretation of the sort I advocate could achieve” one. No,
Waldron eschews all that. This book, instead, aims to “come to
terms with the best that can be said for hate speech regulations”
(p.11). It aims to make a plausible or maybe even persuasive
case in favor of hate speech laws. This will involve offering the
most defensible characterization of these laws that Waldron can.
And at core what Waldron does is to offer what amounts to
a consequentialist argument to that effect. When you throw
everything into the balance, the real harm that vilifying and
humiliating vulnerable groups does will, on occasion, outweigh
the costs that come from using the law to silence people, even in
some instances when the hateful words are not inciting or
provoking violence. That is the gist of the Waldronian case.
Along the way, of course, Waldron needs to tell us what for
him falls under the aegis of “hate speech.” And in different ways
and in different places in the book he does. It is publications
(because Waldron is far more concerned with the written word
that is lasting rather than the spoken word that is ephemeral)
“which express profound disrespect, hatred, and vilification for
members of minority groups” (p. 27); it is a species of “group
defamation” or “group libel” claim (see pp. 39–41, inter alia); it
is “assaults upon the dignity of the persons affected” (p. 59); “[i]t
is a matter of status—one’s status as a member of society in good
standing” (p. 60); and so the point is “that hate speech laws
really are enacted for the benefit of vulnerable racial, ethnic, and
religious minorities, to uphold their reputation and their dignity”
(p. 203).
As you can see from those few selected passages, the
concept of “dignity” plays a large role in Waldron’s argument.
Hence Waldron spends no small amount of time explaining that
“dignity is a complex idea” (p. 59), but at its core it refers to
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people’s “basic social standing, the basis of their recognition as
social equals and as bearers of human rights and constitutional
entitlements” (p. 59).
The real, tangible harm of hate speech, says Waldron, is its
“radical denigration of status and [its] undermining of [the]
assurance [of decent treatment and respect]” (p. 108). And so
the legislating against hate speech can also be understood in
terms of “public order” (p. 53) benefits or the goal of “a wellordered society” (pp. 77–78). And in making the best case he can
for some regulation or outlawing of hate speech Waldron has
various other quivers in his bow. He makes an analogy to
arguments seeking laws against pornography (pp. 89–92, inter
alia); he puts weight on practices in other democratic countries
(pp. 13, 40, 57–58, 149, inter alia); as mentioned already, he
distinguishes undermining dignity from causing offense (much of
chapter five); and he takes on, preemptively, two well-known
thinkers who dislike speech regulation (chapters six and seven).
As I hope I have made clear already, The Harm in Hate
Speech offers a nuanced and erudite case for us to think again
about the desirability of hate speech laws. That said, Waldron’s
argument ultimately fails, in my opinion; it is unpersuasive and
unconvincing, on the grounds I now set out.
PART B—WHY WALDRON’S ARGUMENT FAILS
As Waldron starts his book with a sort of confessional
account of why he came to write this book, let me also lay my
cards on the table. You see, unlike many readers, I am broadly
in the Waldron camp in disliking bills of rights and strong
14
judicial review, on democratic grounds. So the critique that
follows of Waldron’s “best case for hate speech laws” will take
14. See, e.g., James Allan, Bills of Rights and Judicial Power—A Liberal’s
Quandary 16 OXFORD J.LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996); see also JAMES ALLAN, SYMPATHY
AND ANTIPATHY: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL (2002); James Allan, Rights,
Paternalism, Constitutions and Judges, in LITIGATING RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds.,
2002); James Allan, Oh That I Were Made Judge in the Land, 30 FED. L. REV. 561 (2002);
James Allan, A Modest Proposal, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197 (2003); James Allan,
An Unashamed Majoritarian, 27 DALHOUSIE L.J. 537 (2004); James Allan & Grant
Huscroft, Rights Internationalism Coming Home to Roost? 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1
(2006); James Allan, Portia, Bassanio or Dick the Butcher? Constraining Judges in the
Twenty-First Century, 17 KINGS’S L.J. 1 (2006); James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet Again—
Conceptions of Democracy, 25 L. & PHIL. 533 (2006); Allan, Philosopher’s Stone, supra
note 5; James Allan, Meagher’s Mischaracterisations of Majoritarianism, 20 KING’S L.J.
115 (2009); JAMES ALLAN, THE VANTAGE OF LAW: ITS ROLE IN THINKING ABOUT
LAW, JUDGING AND BILLS OF RIGHTS (2011).
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place on Waldron’s home turf, as it were. It will not be a “the
judges should have done X, Y or Z” type critique that points to
some supposed lack of understanding of the First Amendment
case law. Instead, I want to point out weaknesses in the
Waldronian argument taken on its own terms. And I turn to do
that now, under the following five headings.
1) WHAT REALLY IS THE UNDERLYING NATURE OF
WALDRON’S ARGUMENT?
I said above that Waldron offers a consequentialist argument that tries to make the best case it can in favor of hate
speech laws. And I was careful to put it in those terms because
here and there Waldron says such things as “my aim is not
directly to advocate hate speech laws in the United States” (p.
103, and see p. 11). On the other hand, there are times when
Waldron does, in fact, seem to be arguing in favor of hate speech
laws. When talking of vulnerable minorities and the hurt hateful
speech can cause them he says that “[w]e don’t have to dissect
any of this and present it in a pure form in order to understand
the wrongness of hate speech and the wisdom of legislating against
it” (p. 114, emphasis added). Or when telling us how he is using
the concept of dignity, Waldron says that he “used it in the
course of making an argument about the desirability of certain
legislation” (p. 138).
So, in fact, it is not at all clear in this book whether
Waldron’s aim is actually to support the enactment of some
variety or other of hate speech laws, even in the United States,
or whether it is something much woolier and more in the nature
of a Harvard Law School seminar discussion, with Waldron
pointing out that much more can be said on the other side of the
argument than most others suppose, or maybe just plain out
playing Devil’s advocate.
Readers will have to decide for themselves which it is
Waldron really wishes to do. For my part, I would have
preferred the book had it been the case that Waldron had just
stated plainly that he was arguing in favor of a limited variety of
hate speech laws. And I would have preferred that not because
my guess is that that is in fact Waldron’s position (though that is
my guess) or that the equivocation is slightly grating (though it
is), but rather because it would have forced Waldron to be more
specific as to just what he wanted. And that might have either
bolstered his case, or shown up a few weaknesses.
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For instance, at no point in the entire book does Waldron
give us a draft hate speech law that he would endorse. You don’t
really need to do that when you’re making the Harvard Law
School seminar best-case-you-can for such laws. You can point
to various bits of overseas legislation (as Waldron regularly
does), and when pushed say that these “are something for
legislators to consider” (p. 173, also pp. 176–77).
But if you are in fact arguing for some sort of limited hate
speech laws—arguing that these are a good idea—then it seems
to me that you need to tell us what they will look like, or at least
sketch an outline. Merely pointing overseas, as I shall argue
below, has problems of its own, including the dangers of cherrypicking, and of failing to distinguish between criminal and noncriminal hate speech law regimes.
I also said above that Waldron’s argument is in essence a
consequentialist one. Yes, at times in discussing the concept of
dignity the argument briefly moves to more Kantian footings.
But that is not Waldron’s ultimate aim in this book. Here he
wants dignity to be understood in more down-to-earth terms and
he most definitely wants the reader to see, and to acknowledge,
that hateful, vilifying speech has clear bad consequences.
And surely Waldron is correct about that. And yet as
consequentialist arguments go there is undoubtedly more to be
thrown in the balance than the many harms of hateful speech
that Waldron notes. I am not here referring to Dworkin’s claim
that the bad consequences claims made by hate speech laws’
proponents are inflated (pp. 176, 183). Take them to be every bit
as bad as Waldron suggests. Nevertheless, that is surely not the
end of any robust consequentialist weighing up of costs and
benefits. We might also like to consider such other things as how
over-inclusive such hate speech laws might prove to be (see
below); what the knock-on effects will be on a judiciary asked to
decide if speech has “humiliated or terrorized” (p. 84)
individuals in particular groups; what the costs of putting in jail
those not cowed by these laws might be (see below as regards
Canada); and I would have thought we might also like some sort
of comparative analysis of where the vulnerable groups Waldron
focuses upon, say Muslims, do better or worse today—right
now—in terms of being included-in-society, members-in-goodstanding, dignity-bearing citizens. Is it in the U.S. without hate
speech laws or is it in the U.K. or Germany or France or the
countries with hate speech laws that Waldron repeatedly refers
to?
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You see it is far from clear to me that the answer to that
question is not already the U.S., the lack of hate speech laws
notwithstanding. And if that is correct, or even almost correct
(barring a Scandinavian country or two), then that might also
affect one’s consequentialist calculation of the need for hate
speech laws—if much of what you want them for is already
better achieved here than in places that have them, and we
recognize that such laws will carry bad consequences, as well as
potential dignity-enhancing ones.
Instead Waldron merely makes rather brief mention of the
potential dangers of these hate speech laws in terms of their
possibly fostering identity politics (p. 131), or their undermining
the need in society for a certain degree of having a thick skin (p.
126).
But for me, at least, it was an unsatisfying sort of
consequentialist case that Waldron makes in favor of hate
speech laws—assuming, of course, that he is wanting to make
that case and not just seeking to raise our awareness that more
can be said on the other side of this debate.
2) JUST PRECISELY HOW DO HATE SPEECH LAWS BOOST
DIGNITY?
At its very core, Waldron’s argument is that properly
designed and limited hate speech laws can boost the dignity of
vulnerable minority groups by stopping or reducing attempts to
undermine the assurance society makes to them that they have
the status of being members “in good standing.”
But a very big question is just how do hate speech laws do
that? How do they boost dignity? Or put the other way round,
how does hate speech itself undermine this assurance?
And as far as I could tell, Waldron never really makes it
clear how exactly he thinks hate speech undermines this
assurance of good standing and how laws against such speech
15
themselves undermine that undermining.
There are three things Waldron could have said in reply.
One possible reply would be that hate speech attacks dignity and
undermines the assurance of good standing in society by
conveying information to its target groups. This speech that is

15. The next two points I make are in part the fruit of an interesting conversation I
had on this with Larry Alexander.
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hostile to and contemptuous of them gives them information
about the feelings and views and attitudes of the speakers.
On this first mooted Waldronian reply, what hate speech
laws do to boost dignity is to suppress this information. The
target groups then do not get to find out what the hate speakers
think of them. And this delivers to such target groups a certain
sense of security, but it is not a reliable sense of security. It might
even be a false sense of security. And that is because the hate
speech laws do not change or lessen the attitudes and beliefs of
the people cowed by these laws into silence; rather these laws
simply keep the target groups from learning about the existence
of these attitudes.
There are very few hints of this sort of answer to the ‘how
do hate speech laws boost dignity?’ question in The Harm in
16
Hate Speech. And that is surely because such a “willful
blindness is better than knowing the truth” rationale for
supporting hate speech laws is so weak and unpersuasive.
A second possible reply by Waldron—one that is much
more likely that he had in mind—is that hate speech undermines
the assurance of good standing by its effects on listeners outside
the target group. It persuades some of them. It changes their
opinions. The hate multiplies.
And that fear is surely a possibility and one whose
likelihood and bad effects need to be thrown into the
consequentialist hopper or ledger when assessing the desirability
of hate speech laws. Indeed Waldron alludes to this second
possible reply in terms of hate speech being a signaling to others
tool and a focal point for proliferation (see, inter alia, pp. 94–95).
So by stamping out or reducing hate speech by the sanctions
attached to law you prevent the proliferation and so boost—or,
perhaps more accurately, do not further diminish—dignity.
Yet there are real problems with this second mooted reply
as to how precisely it is that hate speech undermines the
assurance to vulnerable groups of their being members of society
in good standing. One very obvious difficulty with this second
mooted basis for claiming that hate speech laws can boost
dignity of some people in vulnerable groups is that it requires
you to take a very dim and pessimistic view as to the capabilities

16. But see p. 95 (“It is sometimes objected that such laws simply drive hate speech
underground. But in a way, that is the whole point . . . .”).
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and capacities of your fellow citizens. Indeed Waldron concedes
that this is precisely the case (p. 153).
Now it may well be that many people, not least in the
Harvard Law School faculty lounge, think such pessimism is
more than warranted when it comes to “the first 200 names in
17
the Boston phone book.” I do not share that pessimistic view.
But many might and some of them may be prepared to argue for
the truth of such pessimism. And to the extent they were
convincing, then to that same extent would this second mooted
reply gain in plausibility.
Of course whatever your view on the underlying merits of
the pessimist’s case as regards the foibles and weaknesses of
one’s fellow citizens and their inabilities to see through the
rantings of Nazis (pp. 94, 95, 226), of cross-burners and KKK
members (pp. 77, 81, 94, 102, 113), of Holocaust deriders (p. 102)
and of those peddling homophobic abuse (pp. 116 ff), it seems
that Waldron himself is in a particularly difficult position in
running this line. After all, the Waldron of days gone by (and
recall that I agree with that early Waldron) argued against overpowerful judges and opposed strong judicial review precisely on
the basis that much disagreement in society, including
disagreements about fundamental and hotly contested issues
understood in terms of rights, were best seen as reasonable
18
disagreements. Put more bluntly, the early Waldron is nothing
if not optimistic about the capacities of his fellow citizens.
Now, I will return below to this question about whether the
core arguments in this book are easily made by a Jeremy
Waldron who wishes to remain consistent with his earlier
positions and views, but for now just note the potential difficulty
for Waldron (as opposed to others with a long-standing
pessimism about the capabilities of regular voters and citizens).
And consider, too, whether it helps Waldron to lay the blame for
this distrust (p. 153) at the feet of real-life legislators who opt to
enact these hate speech laws. There might be scope for the
“best-case-I-can-make” Waldron to finesse the issue in those
terms. But a Waldron who wanted, in fact, to argue for the
enactment of hate speech laws would need to tell us what he
thinks about the capacities of his fellow citizens and whether he
17. See WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BILL: THE
BEST OF WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. 117–18 (1970) (quoting WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.,
RUMBLES LEFT AND RIGHT: A BOOK ABOUT TROUBLESOME PEOPLE AND IDEAS 134–
35 (1963)).
18. See supra, note 10.
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thinks we ought to be pessimistic or optimistic on that score of
the ability of Joe Average Citizen to withstand and see through
the rantings of Holocaust denying neo-Nazis. (And if it be the
latter, that Waldron is himself optimistic about his fellow
citizens’ capacities, then for Waldron this second mooted reply
loses most of its force).
On top of that, there are problems with this second mooted
reply that apply to anyone offering it up as a ground for thinking
that hate speech undermines the assurance of good standing and
that hate speech laws can fix that to some extent (and so boost
dignity).
Here the main difficulty with the “fear of these ideas
proliferating” defense of hate speech laws is that it works so
much better if you simply assume all such speech is false. What if
you worry, though, that some small percentage of it is true? Or
that you can’t be sure where to draw the line foreclosing false
and true speech? In other words, what if you have real worries
about how this will all play out in the real world and that any
hate speech regime—any set of laws Waldron himself can
articulate—will end up being over-inclusive (and no doubt
under-inclusive too)?
It seems to me that these are very deep and concerning
waters indeed, this issue of what speech will be ruled out for its
hateful and dignity-diminishing nature that may in fact turn out
to be true speech or end up indirectly pushing others to see the
truth. Worse, it also strikes me that Waldron fudges or finesses
this issue in the book.
For instance, Waldron includes under the aegis of hate
speech those publications not just directed at race but those
directed also at religion. Indeed on the very first page of the
book he gives what the reader must assume is an example of
hateful speech that the law ought to suppress by raising the
hypothetical of a Muslim man out walking with his two young
children who sees a sign saying “Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve
them, don’t speak to them, and don’t let them in” (p. 1). Yet this
particular example of dignity-diminishing words directed at
religion never really raises the truth issue (of a religion’s tenets,
that is, not of its causal link to terrorism). So what if the sign had
instead simply quoted Professor Richard Dawkins and read that
19
Islam is “one of the great evils of the world”? Surely that is as
19. Dale Miller, “There’s no God and Islam is evil” speech earns Richard Dawkins
ovation from islanders, THE SCOTSMAN, (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.scotsman.com/the-
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likely to affect the dignity of the children in the hypothetical, and
of the father too. And all the more so coming from a worldfamous atheist.
Would Waldron seek to outlaw that? I suspect not. But
Waldron’s attempts to explain which talk about other religions is
okay, and which not, never really make clear how you
distinguish these two. Indeed, for me, there is a tad too much of
what Waldron himself in other contexts terms “happy talk”
about how we all ought to be sensitive to others’ religious beliefs
and such things. But of course many people are not. And what
you are advocating with hate speech laws, at the end of the day,
is attempting to silence people through threats, big fines and yes,
putting them in jail. (See below as regards to Canada.)
So anyone offering up this second mooted reply about how
hate speech can dangerously persuade others needs to tell us
more than Waldron does about how and when we can be sure
that speech about, say, religion is clearly false. Or failing that, he
or she would need to come out of the closet and assert that no
religion or religious tenets can ever lawfully be disparaged
(which, to be clear, is not Waldron’s position, it is just that things
may move that way in practice if Waldron cannot specify what
20
his position is). Accordingly, I do not find this second possible
reply to the question of how hate speech laws will boost dignity
all that much more persuasive than the first one.
That leaves a third and final possible reply as to how this
might come about, how hate speech laws can reduce attempts to
undermine the assurance to people in vulnerable groups of their
being in good standing in society. And here we turn from how
hate speech can persuade others (the focus of the second mooted
reply) to how its outlawing and criminalization might affect the
speaker. Maybe such laws will, after all, change the vile views
and attitudes of some of these speakers?
Certainly Waldron himself never relies on this possibility.
Indeed he is abundantly clear that it is not his aim, through hate
speech laws, to change anyone’s beliefs. The issue does get an
airing in the book’s final chapter, but this is clearly a very weak
basis on which to rest any justification for hate speech laws, and
scotsman/scotland/there-s-no-god-and-islam-is-evil-speech-earns-richard-dawkinsovation-from-islanders-1-2612951.
20. And linked to this criticism is the one I make below about Waldron’s overseas
cherry-picking and focusing only on criminal law hate speech provisions (as in Canada
with the Keegstra case) rather than on the vastly more used civil law sanctions, where
truth is not a defense.
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Waldron rests nothing on it. So I merely mention it as a
possibility here because it might be that you could combine
aspects of this third mooted possibility with bits of the above
second one to hint at an argument in terms of politeness and
socialization being how hate speech laws might achieve the
bolstering of dignity.
This combined sort of possibility might go like this: Lots of
people, and maybe everyone, will have nasty or mean-spirited
tendencies, and socialization involves teaching people to
overcome and control these, instilling in us a sense of what “is
done” and what “just isn’t done”—of what is “normal” in the
sense of both usual and normative. So if we know that something
“isn’t done,” we may still have desires to do it, but we come to
think that we should try to control these desires. Likewise (sort
of, maybe), if a hateful thing is said, the very saying of it tends to
normalize it, and if the thing is said under permission, the
normalization is stronger. So just as with parents teaching
children the basic etiquette of politeness, hate speech laws effect
a type of socialization process of what is and is not acceptable
speech, and even attitudes. So maybe that sort of hybrid of
possibilities two and three process is how we are to think that
hate speech laws will boost dignity?
Alas, even this last wholly speculative hybrid possibility of
21
mine seems implausible. At core it is an argument about
changing speakers’ views and beliefs and still strikes me as a
poor candidate even when spiced up with bits of the second
possibility.
So as far as trying to understand just how hate speech laws
might boost dignity and how hate speech itself might undermine
Waldron’s goal of assuring all and sundry that they have the
status of being members of society “in good standing”—the
quite hard to pin down how this might all work claims—these
were the only three and a half possibilities I could come up with.
And none, alone or together, is overly persuasive.
3) IS WALDRON CHERRY-PICKING?
Part of Jeremy Waldron’s argument in this book, quite a
large part in fact, involves pointing to all sorts of other
democratic jurisdictions, noting that they have hate speech laws,

21. In an earlier form it was first mooted by Steven Smith in a discussion I had with
him.
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and asking you to consider if—at least in this instance—
American exceptionalism is a good idea or a better than even
bet. So Waldron makes repeated references to the United
Kingdom and its Public Order Act, and to Canada and the top
22
court’s decision there in R. v Keegstra, and to Australia, and to
his native New Zealand, and more.
But if we take two of those jurisdictions that I know
passingly well, then it seems to me that Waldron leaves himself
open to the charge that he has cherry-picked his examples. Start
with Canada. Waldron refers to the Keegstra case, a more than
two decades old Supreme Court of Canada decision, in four
separate parts of the book. And it certainly is an important and
leading decision that upheld the constitutionality of criminal
hate speech laws in Canada against attack on the Charter of
Rights’ freedom of expression grounds.
Yet in Canada, or so it seems to me, the criminal law plays a
small to insignificant role in the government’s attempt to
suppress hate speech. Most of the action, nay the vast
preponderance of the action, takes place in administrative
tribunals where truth is not even a defense, where complainants
have all of their costs picked up by the taxpayer but the accused
do not, and where penalties include five-figure fines and (I mean
this seriously) tribunal-backed-by-the-court orders never to
23
speak on certain matters again.
It was in this non-criminal law realm that political
commentator Mark Steyn was ensnared when the biggest selling
Canadian news weekly magazine (largely considered to be
mildly on the left-of-center of Canadian politics, if that matters
to you) published an article that was an excerpt of a chapter of
Steyn’s New York Times Number One best seller, America
Alone. And in that article (and chapter, and book), Steyn
pointed to unchallenged demographic trends related to high
birthrates for Muslims but not for others and expressed grave
concerns about their political, social and cultural implications.
Steyn and that news magazine McLeans were accused of
hate speech and dragged before three separate jurisdictions’
tribunals, the Ontario Human Rights Commission, the British
Columbia Human Rights Commission and the Canadian Human
Rights Commission, by a serial complainant, an official of the
22. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
23. See Lund v. Boissoin, 2008 AHRC 6 (Can.), rev’d, Lund v. Boissoin, 2012
ABCA 300 (Can.).
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Canadian Islamic Council. In some of these tribunals no accused
had ever prevailed—not a single person ever—in the entire time
of these tribunals’ existence. Complainants had a 100 percent
success track record. Those accused of hate speech always lost.
Now the cases against McLeans were eventually dropped,
not least because McLeans had deep pockets and the cases were
embarrassing all sorts of people, but not before the defendants
24
had spent in excess of $2 million on that defense.
Or one could point to the Saskatchewan Christian
evangelist, Bill Whatcott, who was taken before a Saskatchewan
equivalent tribunal and fined for his publications condemning
“sodomite” sex. The man strikes me as a quack, but I very much
doubt he diminishes anyone’s dignity. At any rate, Whatcott
appealed all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, which
earlier this year decided unanimously against him and upheld
the constitutionality of these civil hate speech laws, laws that do
not even make truth a defense—indeed the Supreme Court of
Canada in Whatcott explicitly said that “truth may be used for
25
widely disparate ends.” Whatcott vows now to continue
speaking, which means he will be imprisoned for contempt of
court, in theory until his will is broken, or for life.
And there are dozens and dozens and dozens of similar
cases from Canada—hundreds if you count the many people
who are accused of hate speech, and who would like to fight but
who opt on prudential grounds to make a perfunctory apology,
pay a fine and get away.
So just to be clear, the criminal law route for limiting hate
speech in Canada—with its various built-in safeguards related to
the burden of proof, to truth being a defense and to prosecutions
needing the consent of the Attorney-General—has at a high
level only one single successfully prosecuted case that I know of

24. This was told to me, in person, by Mark Steyn. I have no supplementary proof
of this claim.
25. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, para.
137 (Can.). Of course it is also true that the Supreme Court of Canada read down the
non-criminal hate speech law, severing concepts including dignity: “However, expression
that ‘ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of’ does not rise to the level of
ardent and extreme feelings constituting hatred required to uphold the constitutionality
of a prohibition of expression in human rights legislation.” Id. at 18. And the Court also
narrowed what “hatred” means, further than prior precedents, by saying it was an
objective reasonable-person standard. In short, the Supreme Court of Canada “upheld”
the constitutionality of a different law, with one possible implication being that the Court
doesn’t want it used too much.
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this past quarter century. That’s Keegstra, the one Waldron
repeatedly refers to in this book.
Meantime speech-restricting laws that get a near daily
workout in Canada—laws where truth is not a defense,
complainants get their costs paid but not the accused, just being
offended comes close sometimes to seeming to be enough, and
more—receive not a single mention from Waldron in this entire
book when he looks beyond American shores to weigh up the
costs and benefits of hate speech laws.
Of course, it is also the case that on my reading of this book,
given that Waldron never directly addresses the point, I would
conclude that Waldron is probably against this whole Canadianstyle administrative law “hate speech tribunal” machinery that
focuses in part on mere subjective offence and that does not
make truth a defense. But I would like to have heard Waldron
say so, to tell us whether truth ought to be a defense and all the
rest, and to do so in no uncertain terms.
And as a big believer, like me, in legislative sovereignty,
Waldron might also have mentioned that Canada’s federal
parliament is on the verge of repealing the federal non-criminal
26
s.13 Human Rights Commission hate speech laws. Readers
might even wonder whether the solely criminal law hate speech
27
reducing Keegstra machinery, on its own, could ever accomplish
anything like the volume of speech suppression that would be
needed to make any difference at all to the sort of dignityenhancement that Waldron cares about—the sort of speechsuppressing work done in Canada not by the criminal law but by
these tribunals with all sorts of characteristics of which I infer
Waldron disapproves.
Or turn to Australia. The main vehicle for attempting to
suppress hate speech there is likewise not the criminal law. And
as it happens the current Opposition political party in their
federal Parliament has pledged to repeal this non-criminal hate
28
speech law, so the battle in Australia (where there is no
26. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6, s. 13 (Can.); See Charlie
Gillis, Section 13: How the battle for free speech was won, MACLEAN’S (June 19, 2012),
http://www2.macleans.ca/tag/bill-c-304. The Bill to repeal it has been passed through the
elected lower house, and on June 27th was passed through the wholly unelected and
appointed Upper House Senate. Royal Assent is just a formality and once given the
provision will be repealed.
27. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
28. See Malcolm Farnsworth, Tony Abbott Speech on Free Speech, AUSTRALIAN
POLITICS.COM, (Aug. 6, 2012), http://australianpolitics.com/2012/08/06/tony-abbottspeech-on-free-speech.html (Federal Opposition leader Tony Abbott addressed the
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national bill of rights of any sort) is taking place wholly on
Waldron’s and my preferred turf. But even if we focus on the
courts in Australia, and on this non-criminal law machinery, we
see that the big, notorious case involving hate speech laws there
29
is the Eatock v Bolt case. That case involved a right-of-center
(phew!) political pundit who commented that self-identifying
Aborigines with mere traces of Aboriginal blood were scooping
up too many affirmative action rewards. It is a case anyone
familiar with the Elizabeth Warren saga in the U.S. would
30
immediately recognize.
And the political commentator, Bolt, lost. He had to pay a
small fine, make a pseudo-apology, remove the newspaper
column in question from all websites, and avoid speaking on the
same matter again. Based on the legislation the judge ruled that
Bolt could have made his criticisms less stridently. A key pillar
of the judge’s reasoning was that he didn’t like Bolt’s tone!
Again, I assume that Waldron would not endorse any of
this. But then neither does he mention any of it. And as I noted
above, in any full-blooded consequentialist weighing up of the
pros and cons of the sort of limited, targeted, not applying to
mere offense, leaving truth as a defense, Waldronian-style hate
speech laws, we will surely want to consider whether these are
the sort of contained and bracketed laws that we will end up with
down the road. Or whether they will transmogrify into what you
see in the non-criminal law realm in Canada today.
4) IS THE HATE SPEECH WALDRON CONSISTENT WITH THE
“NO STRONG JUDICIAL REVIEW” WALDRON?
I can be brief here. My comments are directed at the issue
of how easy it is for Jeremy Waldron in particular (as opposed to
someone without his skepticism of strong judicial rule) to write
this book. I pointed out above that there is a certain sort of
pessimism about the capacities of one’s fellow citizens to see
through hate-mongers that runs through what is probably the
most plausible (but still weak) account of just how it is that hate
speech might undermine the assurance of good standing and so
possibly require the enactment of hate speech laws. And I
Institute of Public Affairs about the importance of free speech and repealing Section
18(c) of the Racial Discrimination Act).
29. Eatock v Bolt (No. 2) [2011] FCA 1180 (Austl.).
30. Garance Franke-Ruta, Is Elizabeth Warren Native American or What?, THE
ATLANTIC (May 20, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/iselizabeth-warren-native-american-or-what/257415.
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queried whether Waldron could actually come out and openly
say that he himself was pessimistic about his fellow citizens’
abilities. Or rather whether he could do that today without
undermining some of his earlier core positions that buttressed
his arguments against strong judicial review.
Frankly, I am somewhat doubtful on that score, but I also
recognize that someone of Waldron’s erudition and abilities may
have reconciling arguments that I have yet to anticipate. So I just
raise those doubts.
However, related to this theme of whether Waldron has
changed any of his earlier views, there is another passage in this
book that seems to me to call for further clarification. Waldron
claims that:
I belong to a school of thought that accepts that the
tasks assigned to courts and administrators in matters of
fundamental rights (rights to free expression, rights to
dignity) will often be delicate and challenging, often
involve balancing different goods, and essaying difficult
value judgments [with a citation to his July 2011 British
Academy Review paper “Thoughtfulness and the Rule
of Law” and to Ronald Dworkin’s Freedom’s Law: The
Moral Reading of the Constitution] (pp. 115-16).
To which I am inclined to ask, ‘Really?’ The Waldron of the
articles cited in note 10, above, and of Moral Truth and Judicial
31
32
Review and of Ego-Bloated Hovel and of Some Models of
33
Dialogue between Judges and Legislators, and more again,
accepts that there ought to be a lot of moral input at the pointof-application of laws? Certainly on my understanding of what it
means to be a normative legal positivist or democratic legal
positivist (into which category I put myself and into which
category I thought that Waldron put himself) the desire is to
limit or minimize judges’ scope for moral and normative input at
the point-of-application—be it for good consequentialist reasons
(my thinking) or because you build up from non-consequentialist
equality grounds to a “right to participate in social decisionmaking,” making this your “right of rights” (which is more or
less what I took Waldron to think).

31. 43 AM. J. JURIS. 75 (1998).
32. 94 NW. U.L. REV. 597 (2000).
33. See Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA (Grant Huscroft & Ian Brodie eds.,
2004).
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Of course a very careful reading of the above passage from
the book could read the term “accepts” near the start to be an
“is” claim rather than an endorsing “ought” claim, in which case
Waldron might just be acknowledging the state of play in a
world with constitutionally entrenched bills of rights as in
Canada or the U.S.. Yet that is not the most obvious reading of
that passage, especially given that it is made in the context of
disavowing hate speech laws that would be “presented with rule34
like clarity, uncontroversially administrable, requiring nothing
in the way of further moral judgment or careful thought and
discretion” (p. 115).
And then there are the various hints throughout this book
that the core goal of hate speech laws is not so much to block
and suppress any particular set of ideas, however loathsome, but
more to stop particularly nasty and crude articulations of those
ideas. Yet this “just rephrase what you want to say in less
epithet-laden terms and you can still say it” position seems to me
to be quite precariously close to one that amounts to legislating
in favor of intelligent people, Harvard Law School type people,
who have the resources to frame their beliefs (however nasty) in
terms that will pass some sort of “how did you say what you
believe?” test. In other words, it works against the common man
and woman. And we can even speculate on whether such a
Waldron-mandated need to say things the proper way might not
have the unintended and undesired effect of making certain
detestable views more persuasive and more effective than they
would otherwise be, by putting a clever and moderate-sounding
new spokeswoman on an old National Front soap box, as it were.
Who knows?
What I think I can say, though, is that parts of the argument
in The Harm in Hate Speech left me wondering whether
Waldron had changed or refined or qualified any of the views
related to his well-known anti-strong judicial review position.

34. Of course as Waldron himself has made clear in the past, no one really argues
for no moral or normative input at the point-of-application, as that would be impossible.
The argument is a relative one, to keep this to a bare minimum so as to increase the input
of voters and legislators. See Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in
HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 411-33
(Jules L. Coleman ed., 2001).
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5) IS WALDRON’S ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH “CAUSING
OFFENCE” AND “UNDERMINING DIGNITY” CONVINCING?
I can be even briefer here. Despite Waldron’s erudite
attempts to distinguish speech that merely causes offence (and
so ought not to be silenced by law) and speech that undermines
the dignity of the listener (which, at least potentially, ought to be
silenced) I remained doubtful about the ability of any real-life
hate speech law to implement this distinction. That is not just
because Waldron at times in this book talks of the need for laws
to protect against “being discriminated against or humiliated”
(p. 84, inter alia) and that I cannot ultimately see how being
humiliated is any less of a subjective issue (so not about one’s
objective standing in society with only ancillary effects as regards
one’s feelings) than being offended. To my mind, if dignityundermining differs from offence-giving then it seems to me it
must also differ from causing humiliation.
Nor is it just because Waldron in this book tells us he is “not
a supporter of the proposal to ban the burqa [for liberty and
freedom of religion reasons while, oddly, suggesting that a main
reason for wanting the ban is the desire not to be seen by the
world as a society of religious conservatives]” (p. 76), and I
found myself thinking that that stance of his might be hard to
square with his desire to have the law uphold a sort of objective
test of being a “non-degraded member of society in good
35
standing.”
It is also because I believe that drafting any statutory
provision that is to be enacted in the hope of criminalizing some
set of words that will undermine dignity but at the same time
that will never directly or just criminalize the hurting of the
feelings of others is beyond the wit of man. Which may or may
not be why Waldron never offers the reader any suggested draft
laws that show this skepticism of mine is misplaced. But I leave
this issue wholly for the reader to decide.
CONCLUSION
I want to repeat that this is a thought-provoking,
stimulating, and erudite book. At the same time I think that it
ultimately fails to convince if you come to the book as I do,
35. Which may be why Waldron admits the burqa ban issue is “complicated” (p.
76), and concedes that “the arguments that are used to support a burqa ban are not a
million miles from the arguments that I am pursuing in this book” (p. 77). I would have
put the distance somewhat closer than Waldron does.
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someone happy to consider the various costs and benefits of
enacting hate speech laws (however limited). In addition, the
book would have benefitted if Waldron had seen fit to include
even a couple of examples of hate speech emanating from
people other than the usual suspects of neo-Nazis, skinheads,
Islamaphobes, KKK members, cross-burners and Holocaust
deniers that he trots out. Surely there are some examples of antiSemitic hate speech from Black Muslim leaders, say, that might
have been included, or from Imams in the United Kingdom, or
perhaps some vile speech more generally from some of today’s
rap music or examples directed at Mormons. Anything to dispel
the patently false lurking suggestion that dignity-diminishing
speech comes only (or overwhelmingly) from the extremes of
one side of politics.
Of course in a fundamental sense I agree whole-heartedly
with that manifestation of Waldron that argues here and there in
this book that it should be left to elected legislators whether to
enact hate speech laws. Indeed I prefer, too, that these laws also
be removed by those same legislators, as has now partially taken
place in Canada and possibly will do so in Australia after their
next election. It is just that I disagree with Waldron that the case
for having such laws is at all convincing or persuasive. And I say
that despite Waldron’s efforts in this book to change the minds
of people like me.
Whatever the harm in hate speech, my view is that any set
of real life hate speech laws that Waldron might have proposed
had he seen fit to do so would either have had vanishingly few
dignity-enhancing effects in practice or it would have rather
massively over-reached, as in Canada. The costs would outweigh
the benefits.

